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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE PERFORMANCE OF "WHAT ONE IS
ALREADY BOUND TO DO" AS A CON-
SIDERATION IN WISCONSIN
The reason for the rule "that the performance of what one is
already bound to do" cannot be a consideration is bound up with
the history of the doctrine of consideration for which many
theories hare been advanced by the learned writers. It is note-
worthy that prior to the fifteenth century, simple promises were
not enforceable at Common Law. They were enforceable in equity,
however, hence the theory has been advanced that consideration
is a modification of the Roman principle, causa, i. e. motive,
adopted by equity and later transferred into the Common Law.
But the fact remains, however, that the modern doctrine of con-
sideration seems to have grown up through the technical develop-
ment of an innovation upon two Common Law actions, namely
debt and the action on the case for deceit.'
The desire of the Common Law judges to bring an action upon
simple promises within their jurisdiction led to the development
of assumpsit. The action on the case for deceit sounded in tort.
The wrong being conceived as a sort of trespass, the action was
not contested by a wager of law. The damages were the detriment
incurred by the plaintiff upon the assumpsit of the defendant
through mawfeasance only. Gradually it was held that the action
would lie for a nonfeasance. The action became the proper rem-
edy for a nonperformance of a promise and was known as as-
sumpsit. The damages were the detriment suffered by the
promisee at the request of the promisor.
This new remedy proved so efficacious, that soon debt on simple
contract was brought within its scope. When a debt was created,
the transaction was regarded as reciprocal grants, i. e. the quid
pro quo passing between the parties. The debt itself was deemed
as a sort of chattel in the hands of the defendant and involving
a legal duty to pay it to the plaintiff. The defendant could contest
the action of debt by wager of battle. Moreover the action of debt
involved many extremely technical requirements. Gradually it
was held, that assumpsit would lie for debt by parol, i. e. a promise
'Sources: Salmond's History of Contracts; Select Essays in Anglo-American History, Vol. 3, P. 320; Ames' History of Assumpsit, ibid., p.259; Holmes, The Common Law, p. 289; Jenlks Short History of English
Low, p. 132; Ames, Lectures on Legal History, p. 323.
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to pay a precedent debt. Soon after it was declared that assump-
git would lie upon any simple debt, without proof of any subse-
quent promise, supported by the quid pro quo of the original
transaction.2 Thus indebitatus assumpsit was the proper remedy
upon a parol promise, express or implied, (a) Bro. Act. at Law,
317, to pay a debt, though generally restricted to an implied prom-
ise; (b) Stephan P1. 318. In it, the damages were the benefit to
the promisor, upon his request, express or implied.
The modem theory of consideration, then, reflects the quid pro
quo of the action in debt and detriment in the action upon the case
for nonperformance. Its test is something of benefit to the
promisor or some detriment or loss to the promisee, and although
both are always present theoretically, yet the idea of but one of
the requirements being actually present is not excluded.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has repeatedly laid down the
doctrine of consideration in this state. Where A promised in
consideration of B's entering certain land, that such land would
sell for $2oo or more on a certain day, held no consideration.' So
where A gave a note secured by mortgage for a mere squatter's
claim likely to be defeated by a sale of the land by the United
States government, the court held the note void for want of con-
sideration, saying there must be some benefit arising to the de-
fendant or some loss or injury to the plaintiff.4 And where A
promised to pay B a certain sum of money provided the promisee
should erect a hotel within a specified time and upon a certain site,
held that there was a consideration. The court said: "It must be
some matter of benefit to him who makes the promise or of some
loss or disadvantage to whom it is made: and in addition to this
it must appear that it arose or was moved at the express or im-
plied request of the promisor."" So where A alone agreed to raise
a four-acre crop of tobacco at a stated price per pound, the court
said: "It therefore appears that no consideration moved from
the plaintiff to the defendant either by way of money or things
of value or of promise at the time the agreement was signed. It
is elementary that there must be a consideration either by way of
'Slade's case, 4 Croke 92 B; Sunderland's Case on Common Law Plead-
ing; 2 Street Foundations of Legal Liability 62-66, ibid., on note, p. 139
'Stevens v. Coon, i Pin. 356; Lathrop v. Knapp, 27 Wis. 214.
"Messenger v. Miller, 2 Pin. 6o; Drovers Dep. Bank Co. v. Tichenor, x56
Wisconsin 251.
'Eyclesheitner v. Van Antwerp, 13 Wis. 346; Dohr v. Wolfgang, 151
Wis. 95.
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money or things of value or by way of promises, fo constitute a
valid contract."
From the foregoing it is obvious that where A has delivered
goods or performed work at B's request and by agreement of the
parties or by implication of law, a promise to pay has been raised,
a subsequent promise by B to perform can neither be a benefit to
A nor a detriment to B. Neither could the payment of this debt
be a detriment to B even though induced by a promise on the part
of A. And on principle it would seem that where A has promised
to B to do a certain thing, then a subsequent promise to perform
made by A to B. could not be a benefit to B, nor would the per-
formance by A moved by a subsequent promise on part of B be a
detriment to A.
We may distinguish, for the purpose of this article, between the
performance of a public duty and a duty arising out of a contract
relation; between the payment of a debt, liquidated or un-
liquidated, and performance or nonperformance; between con-
tracts executed on one side and contracts wholly executory.
That the performance of an obligation imposed by public law
cannot be a valid consideration has been universally recognized on
grounds of public policy. So a sheriff's promise to perform his
duties with "reasonable diligence" was held to be no consider-
ation. 7 But where A promised a reward to a fireman for the
rescue of A's wife or her body, the court held that there was a
consideration in the absence of a 'provision in the municipal
charter requiring a fireman to save human life at the risk of his
own life.8 Where a husband promised to care for, nurse and
support his wife after marriage, she being blind, the court held
that, "neither the doing of what he is bound in law to do nor the
promise so to do is a consideration for his wife's promise to be-
queath him her property."9
The question whether the performance of a pre-existing con-
tractural duty to the promisor will support a promise arises chiefly
in cases of promises in consideration of the payment of a part or
the whole of a debt. As the rule in the first class of cases is
stated: "the part payment of an admitted, liquidated debt in the
Vones v. Wixom, I7o Wis. 314; Hopkins v. Racine M. & W. L Co., 13
Wis. 583.
'Padden v. Tronson, 45 Wis. 126.
'Reif v. Paige, 55 Wis. 496; Ring v. Devlin, 68 Wis. 384.
'Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431; Perkinson v. Clarke, 135 Wis. 584; Es-
tate of Simeonson. 164 Wis. 59o.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
same mode, place or time as provided in the original agreement
can not be a satisfaction of the whole." This rule is as old as the
doctrine of consideration itself and has been firmly established
down through a long line of judicial decisions and has been strictly
adhered to in Wisconsin. Thus where A was indebted to B on
two accounts but paid B less than the aggregate sum of the two
accounts and both were receipted for in full, held that the whole
indebtedness was not extinguished. The court said: "Ever since
the case of Cumber v. Wane, i Strange 426, it has been the settled
law, that a bald promise by a creditor, for no other consideration
or benefit than the mere payment in money of a part of an ad-
mitted debt, to accept such part in satisfaction of the whole was
void for want of consideration."' 0
But in spite of their steadfast adhesion to this rule in face of
the demands and needs of a much greater business and more ex-
tensive mercantile dealings, the courts have criticised and con-
demned the unreasonableness of the rule. But while the courts
still hold the doctrine of Cumber v. Wane, yet they will bend
backwards to see if there is the least possible quantum of addi-
tional consideration present. In a leading case the court said:
"The rigorous rule of the Common Law, permitting a person
to receive part of an undisputed, presently due indebtedness, pre-
tending to accept the same in satisfaction of the whole indebted-
ness, the debtor parting with the amount paid with that under-
standing, and then change front and sue for the balance of such
indebtedness on the ground that the release thereof was void for
want of consideration, is so little favored by the courts that it is
commonly held not to apply where anything, whether of advan-
tage to the creditor or of disadvantage to the debtor, can be rea-
sonably said to stand for that part of the indebtedness not measured
by an- equivalent in money actually paid to the creditor." The
court after a further discussion added: "It is said that there is
sufficient consideration moving with the part payment to release
an indebtedness to take the transaction out of the Common Law
rule, if the debtor does anything which he is not bound by law
to do, or omits to do anything which he has a right to do, to the
advantage, in any appreciable degree, of the creditor or the dis-
advantage of himself ; that the consideration in addition to money
"Otto v. Klauber, 23 Wis. 471; See Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. cases 6o5,
36 Eng. Reports x94: Jaffray v. Davi.s, 124 N. Y. 164.
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paid 'may consist of anything which might be a burden to the
one party or benefit to the other.' ""'
The decisions in Wisconsin from an early date are in accord
with these principles. Thus where A the mortgagee by parol
agreement promised to release the mortgagor upon payment of a
sum less than the whole of the mortgage money due, held that such
agreement cannot be enforced for want of consideration.12 But it
was held otherwise where an unsecured debt was paid by a se-
cured mortgage, 23 or a draft,14 or any other negotiable instrument
of a less amount than due. 5 But not where the debtor's own un-
secured note for a less sum was given in full payment.8 Where
part payment is made or a note is given by a third person, held to
be sufficient consideration." So where certain property of an in-
solvent debtor was held as collateral security, the giving of an
absolute title to the creditor, and the debtor's agreement not to
take advantage of the Federal bankruptcy law, held to be ample
consideration to support an agreement to accept a less sum than
due. 8
The question sometimes arises whether the acceptance of a
check by the creditor from the debtor for a lesser sum than
claimed will be an accord and satisfaction. But it has been
decided in Wisconsin that where the amount due is undisputed,
the mere acceptance by the creditor of a check for a lesser sum,
but containing the words "paid in full" did not in the absence of
any consideration for a release of the balance operate as a settle-
ment or an accord and satisfaction. 9
There is a very important class of cases, wherein an insolvent
debtor enters into an agreement with more than one of his credi-
tors whereby the latter agree, for the sake of immediate payment,
to relinquish a part of their claims upon the debtor and to accept
a sum less than the amount due, distributed pro rata, in discharge
'Herman v. Schlesinger, 114 Wis. 382. See notes to ii L. R. A. (N. S.)
xox8.
"Stone v. Lannon, 6 Wis. 497.
"Continental Bank Co. v. McGeogh, 9z Wis. 286. See note to Fuller v.
Kemp, 2o L. R. A. 785.
"'Reid v. Hibbard, 6 Wis. i75.
'Continental Bank Co. v. MeGeogh, 92 Wis. 286.
'Hooker v. Hyde, 61 Wis. 6o4. ,
"Continental Bank Co. v. McGeogh, 92 Wis. 286.
'Herman v. Schlesinger, 114 Wis. 382; See ix L. R. A. (N. S.) xoxg in
notes.
"Prairie Grove Cheese Mfg. Co. v. Luder, 115 Wis. 2o. But see Ossowski
v. WJiesncr, ioi Wis. 238.
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of their claims. The consideration is found in the mutual re-
linquishment on part of the creditors. These agreements or com-
positions have been found to be conducive of the needs of the
business world and are rigidly enforced in Wisconsin.20 So it was
held that-where a creditor after entering into a composition, sued
upon the original claim, he could recover only the rate fixed in the
composition agreement.21 And that a debtor may set up such an
agreement as a defense.2 And where one creditor entered into a
secret agreement with the debtor, whereby the former received
payment in full of his original demand, held to be fraud which
would invalidate the composition agreement.2 1
These cases are to be distinguished from cases of compromise
wherein a single creditor enters into an agreement with his debtor,
in settlement of an unliquidated or a doubtful or a disputed claim
in consideration of the mutual surrender of some counterclaim .2
But the payment of that part of the claim which is undisputed
cannot be a sufficient consideration in settlement or compromise to
bar an action for the balance of the claim. 25
Since the part payment of an undisputed debt cannot be a suffi-
cient consideration to extinguish the whole, then the foregoing is
clearly applicable to the payment or the promise to pay the whole
of the debt. Where A sold a certain number of sheep to B who
agreed to pay for them in wool and sheep at a later date, and B
gave a mortgage upon his land as a security for the payment of
this debt, and subsequently, the parties agreed to wind up this
transaction and B promised to pay a certain sum of money in lieu
of the sheep and wool, but A did not surrender the mortgage held
as a security nor did B ever pay the promised money, whereupon
A sued to foreclose the mortgage, and B set up his promise to pay
in money as a discharge of the debt, held that if such promise to
pay in money was intended to be received in discharge of the debt
A could not foreclose the mortgage. The court said: "When a
debt is due by one contract, the parties may abolish it and substi-
Continental Bank Co. v. McGeogh, 92 Wis. 286.
"Mellin v'. Goldsmith, 47 Wis. 573.
=Davenport v. First Cong. Society, 33 Wis. 387.
'Musgat 'v. Wyboro, 33 Wis. 515.
'Continental Bank Co. v. McGeogh, 92 Wis. 286.
Reid v. Hibbard, 6 Wis. 175.
Collins v. State, 13 Wis. 398.
Kerchezva v. Doty, 31 Wis. 476.
Hewit v. Currier, 63 Wis. 394.
'Weidner v. Standard Life and American Ins. Co., i3o Wis. 2o. See
Ripley v. Sage L. and L Co., 138 Wis. 304 in dissenting opinion.
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tute another in its place. In such case if the substituted contract
is founded upon any new or sufficient consideration, or if made
upon the compromise of a doubtful or a disputed claim, the
original debt is extinguished, and no action can be maintained
upon it. And this is so, whether the substituted contract be kept
and performed or not. A new or sufficient consideration arises
when the-substituted contract is advantageous to the creditor, that
is when he derives a distinct benefit from it, something of value to
which he would not have been entitled under the original
contract.
'26
So it has been decided that where there is a mere request for
the extension of the due date of a debt, and the debtor promises
to pay interest on an existing contract according to its terms
during a delay in performance, or to pay the principal, such
promise does not constitute a consideration for an extension since
it is only a promise to do that what the debtor is bound "to do
without a promise.2 7 But the payment of interest before the
mortgage is due is a sufficient consideration for the extension of
time.2
8
The question of whether the performance of a pre-existing
contractural obligation at the request of a third party may be a
valid consideration has been decided in Wisconsin. Thus where
A promised to remit the debt owing by B to A, if B should pay
its debts to C, the court said: "It might cause the defendant some
trouble and inconvenience to pay its debts, but we are not aware
of any principle of law which would make such payment alone a
sufficient consideration for a promise on the part of its creditors
to relinquish his claim." 29
Where A, a district superintendent, promised to make good
losses through* defalcations of a sub-agent, supposing himself
legally responsible, held not be such a benefit to him to support a
promise by the company to pay its own debts or perform its obli-
gations to third persons.8 0
But where a debt has been barred by the statute of limitations
or by proceedings in bankruptcy, a subsequent promise to pay
'Palmer v. Yager, 2o Wis. 91.
'Fanning v. Murphy, 126 Wis. 538; See Goll v. Fehr, 131 Wis. 141;
Murtha v. Donohoo, 149 Wis. 481.
'Ready v. Somers, 37 Wis. 265; Grace v. Lynch, 8o Wis. 166; Welch v.
Kukuk, 128 Wis. 419; see notes to 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 583.
'Davenport v. First Cong. Society, 33 Wis. 387.
'McKone v. Metrop. Ins. Co., 132 Wis. 243. 259.
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such debt is a valid consideration, since all legal obligation to pay
it has been extinguished by operation of law.3
While the rule that the performance or promise to perform a
pre-existing contractural duty cannot be a consideration, as illus-
trated in the foregoing cases, holds true generally in respect to
contracts wholly executed on one side, yet in the application of
this principle to contracts wholly executory the courts are not, by
any means, in accord. Thus where a party to an agreement find-
ing the contract more onerous than was expected, refuses to
perform unless the other party to the contract will agree to give
extra compensation or to alter or modify the contract, the question
of whether such modification, alteration or additional benefit is
supported by a valid consideration, is decided upon different prin-
ciples in the various jurisdictions of this country.
Some courts hold that such promise for extra compensation is
not supported by sufficient consideration, since the plaintiff has
agreed only to do that which he was already under legal obligation
to do.-2 But in many jurisdictions these cases seem to have been
decided upon another principle. In some of these, they are de-
cided upon the theory, that the party by refusing to perform his
contract thereby subjects himself to an action for the recovery of
damages, and that the opposite party has an election to bring an
action for the recovery of such damages or to accede to the
demands of his adversary and make the promise, and if he does
so it is a relinquishment of the original contract and the substi-
tution of a new one." In others, this doctrine is limited to cases
wherein the party refusing to complete does so by reason of some
unforeseen and substantial difficulty in the performance of his
contract, and which cast upon him an additional burden not fore-
seen; in such case the promise to coninue is held to be a sufficient
consideration for the additional compensation promised."4 But
Wisconsin has steadily held, down through a long line of deci-
sions, that the parties to any contract, if they continue interested
and act upon any sufficient consideration while it remains execu-
tory and before a breach of it occurs, may rescind it in whole or
t Marshall v. Holmes, 68 Wis. 555.
'Ayres v. Chicago R. I. & R. Co., 52 Iowa 478; Lingenfelder v. Wain-
wright Brewing Co., io3 Mo. 578; Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328.
'Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 305; Lattimer v. Harsen, 14 John. 330;
Rogers v. Rogers, z39 Mass. 44o; Lens v. Brown, 40 Wis. 172.
"King v. Duluth, M. & N. R. Co., 61 Minn. 482; see Williston on Con-
tracts, Vol. x, Sect. 13o, i3oa; Abbot v. Grant Marble Works, 142 Wis. 279.
See L. R. A. 1915 B. x, for full discussion of this class of cases.
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in part, alter or modify it in any respect, add to or supplement or
replace it by a new and later agreement.35
Where A the owner of an half interest in a steam vessel agreed
to sell one-sixth of his interest to B for six hundred and seventy-
five dollars who paid four hundred dollars down and fifty dollars
at a later time; and subsequently such vessel was wrecked in a
collision with another steamer, and A commenced action for
damages and promised B to pay him the sum he had invested in
the vessel with interest, if B should assist him in the recovery of
such damages, which B did; and after the recovery of such
damages A renewed such promise to pay when he should collect
the amount of recovery, and upon suit on such promise, A con-
tended that the consideration for such promise was merely that
which A was already bound to pay B as a copartner, the court
said, "We take it to be well settled that the parties to a contract
may by a mutual agreement vary or modify its terms, or rescind
it, without any new consideration therefor. In the case of a
modification or change of a contract, the consideration for the
original agreement is imported into the new agreement which is
substituted for it."3
So where A contracted to do certain work for B, but after such
agreement and before doing the work under the contract A in-
sisted that the contract was contradictory, and absolutely refused
to do any work thereunder unless the same be modified and B by
a parol agreement promised additional compensation to A for the
performance of some parts of the contract, held that the consider-
ation existing in the original executory contract was imported
into the modification by the subsequent parol agreement, and
became binding upon the parties without any new consideration."1
And where A contracted with B to perform certain work in the
construction of a railway and finding himself unable to carry out
his agreement without further loss, informed B that he would
discontinue his work, whereupon B orally agreed to furnish him
with more implements and to pay him what his labor was reason-
ably worth if A should continue; held that the parties could
modify their contract without any new or further consideration 88
uPaliner v. Yager, 2o Wis. 9I; Brown v. Everhard, 52 Wis. 2o5; Kelly
v. Bliss, 54 Wis. 187, citing Stead v. Dauber, io Aid. and El. 57; Goss v.
Nugent, 5 Boom and Ad., 58; Snell v. Bray, 56 Wis. 156.
"Kelley v. Bliss, 54 Wis. 187; Ruege v. Gates, 71 Wis. 634.
"Lynch v. Henry, 75 Wis. 631.
'Foley v. Marsch, I6z Wis. 25.
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Where A assigned certain patents to B and agreed to assign all
such further inventions to B during the life of the patent and sub-
sequently the parties entered into another agreement substantially
the same as the previous one, except for an enlargement in the
duration of the time of assignments for future patents, and the
payment of a nominal consideration, and upon suit on the substi-
tuted contract for specific performance, the adequacy of the con-
sideration to support the enlargement upon the previous contract
was attacked, held that since the purpose of the substituted
contract was to carry out the original intention of the parties,
there was a sufficient consideration for the original contract to
support the modification by the substituted contract, and that the
payment of an additional consideration was unnecessary."9
It is essential however for the effectiveness of this rule in this
class of cases, that where a written contract is modified by parol,
that such parol negotiations take place after the written instrument
is executed and in effect, lest they become part and parcel of the
contract, and further, that such parol or oral agreements fall
without the Statute of Frauds.40
Upon a recapitulation of the cases discussed in this article, it
may be concluded, that in Wisconsin, the performance or the
promise to perform a duty imposed by public law can never be a
benefit to the promisor nor a detriment to the promisee ;41 that
where the contract has been executed on one side, the performance
or the promise to perform by or to the other party or a third
person cannot be a benefit to the promisor nor a detriment to the
promise without something additional, by way of advantage or
of disadvantage to either party;42 and lastly, that where the
contract is wholly executory, the rule "that the performance of
what one is already bound to do" is obviated by the application of
another principle: "that a contract which is based upon a sufficient
consideration, and which is wholly executory or substantially so,
and before a breach of it occurs, may be modified, altered or sub-
stituted by the mutual consent of the parties thereto without any
new consideration, and that the consideration of the old agreement
is imported into the new one.' 4 3 JOSEPH WITMER, '24.
'Miller Saw-Trimmer Co. v. Cheshire, 172 Wis. 278, 293, 304.
"Schoblasky v. Rayworth, 139 Wis. ii5; Brown v. Everhard, 52 Wis.
2o5; Wis. S. F. Co. v. D. K. Jeffries Lumber Co., 132 Wis. 1.
'Padden v. Tronson, 45 Wis. 126; Estate of Simeonson, 164 Wis. 590.
'Palmer v. Yager 20 Wis. 91; Herman v. Schlesinger, 114 Wis. 382.
"Brown v. Everhard, 52 Wis. 2o5; Kelley -v. Bliss, s4 Wis. 187.
